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In recent years, the Supreme Court has put up roadblocks for workers who seek
relief in court for wrongs committed by their employers. This development is a consequence of the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, a
2018 decision, was par for the course. The Supreme Court held that employers could
prevent group wage-and-hour claims by enforcing individual arbitration agreements. It rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that their litigation activity was protected
by labor law. In dissent, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg questioned the application of
the decision to Title VII pattern-or-practice cases. Indeed, Epic Systems puts potential Title VII plaintiffs in a bind. Class waivers in arbitration agreements prevent
employees from banding together in group actions. But every circuit court to consider
the question has determined that only a class—not an individual plaintiff—can litigate a claim of a pattern or practice of discrimination under Title VII. Taken together, the Supreme Court’s arbitration cases and the circuit courts’ Title VII jurisprudence would seem to eviscerate the pattern-or-practice suit.
In this Comment, I argue that Epic Systems does not reach all Title VII plaintiffs. First, I contend that some Title VII litigation is protected by the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA), notwithstanding Epic Systems. Congress gave Title VII
plaintiffs the ability to obtain broad remedial relief to address discriminatory conditions, unlike in the wage-and-hour context. Like strikes or collective bargaining,
litigation is one way that employees can reform the workplace. Then, I suggest that
courts should borrow a test from securities law to evaluate whether a group of employees is sufficiently independent and cohesive to bring a pattern-or-practice case.
Courts can give effect to the NLRA and Title VII without scrapping arbitration
agreements entirely.
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INTRODUCTION
Jeffboat launched its last barge into the Ohio River in 2018. 1
Once the largest inland shipbuilder in the United States, the company had endured its share of tumult since its founding in 1834,
including intermittent closures, a wildcat strike, and a privateequity acquisition. 2 From 1977 to 1993, Jeffboat was caught up
in a protracted employment discrimination class action under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 3 Black employees were
less often promoted and more frequently fired than white employees were. 4 Jeffboat stamped each Black applicant’s file with “DW,”
the initials of a local civil rights activist. 5 In the rigging unit,
which did not employ any Black workers until 1973, a sign
1F

2F

3F

4F

5F

1
Pat McDonogh, As the Last Barge Rolls Off the Line, Jeffboat Workers Say Goodbye to an Era and Their Jobs, LOUISVILLE COURIER J. (Apr. 24, 2018),
https://perma.cc/6HKM-FNXP.
2
Id.; Sam Stall, Barge Builder Embraces Stability, IND. BUS. J. (June 17, 2015),
https://perma.cc/RQ7H-FG7F. A “wildcat strike” is one unauthorized by union leadership.
Wildcat Strike, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://perma.cc/VBK7-3P7P.
3
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a–2000h-6; Mozee v. Am. Com. Marine Serv. Co., 940 F.2d 1036,
1038 (7th Cir. 1991), aff’d and reh’g denied, 963 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1992).
4
Mozee, 940 F.2d at 1043.
5
Id. at 1043–44. Jeffboat claimed that the markings were to help them implement
an affirmative action program.
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declared, “No N——r Riggers.” 6 In 1975, the shipyard’s Black
Workers’ Coalition organized mass actions known as the “Black
Days” protests in response to these conditions. Shortly after participating in the protests, William Mozee was suspended and ultimately fired by Jeffboat. 7 In 1977, Mozee and three coworkers
filed a class action lawsuit against Jeffboat, alleging violations of
Title VII under pattern-or-practice and disparate-impact theories
of discrimination. 8 The case settled for $1.8 million in 1993,
shortly after the Seventh Circuit partially upheld the district
court’s determination of liability. 9
A solo litigant likely could not have achieved what Mozee and
his coworkers did together. That class used the pattern-or-practice
method, under which plaintiffs allege that their employer uses a
discriminatory business practice that affects all members of a certain group. 10 Every circuit that has considered the question has
held that only classes, not individuals, can litigate a claim of a
pattern or practice of discrimination under Title VII. 11 Yet today,
workers face a barrier to bringing such class actions: arbitration
agreements. Driven both by the high cost of litigation—indeed,
Jeffboat endured two trials over fifteen years before settling the
case—and the business-friendly evolution of arbitration jurisprudence, 12 companies now use arbitration agreements to limit the
ability of employees to litigate disputes or pursue collective relief.
Arbitration agreements prevent group actions in two ways. 13
First, plaintiffs cannot maintain class actions in court regarding
6F

7F

8F

9F

10F

1F

12F

13F

6

Id. at 1044 (alteration added).
Id. at 1040.
8
Id. at 1039. A fifth employee filed suit in 1978, and his action was consolidated
with the others. Id. Disparate-impact claims involve facially neutral policies that have an
adverse impact on a protected group. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k). Under a pattern-or-practice
theory (also termed “systemic disparate treatment”), plaintiffs allege that an employer
had an intentionally discriminatory employment practice. See International Brotherhood
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 & n.15 (1976).
9
Shipyard to Pay $1.8 Million to Settle Discrimination Suit, CHI. TRIB., June 21,
1993, ProQuest, Doc. No. 283520984.
10 See infra Part I.A.1.
11 See Daniels v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 701 F.3d 620, 632 (10th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases from the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits).
12 See Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American Employers Are Using
Mandatory Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1317
(2015) (“[A] series of Supreme Court decisions have enabled employers to require their nonunionized employees to resolve disputes through arbitration, rather than litigation.”).
13 I use the term “group action” to refer to any proceeding in court or arbitration in
which multiple plaintiffs pursue common claims, including via joinder or a class or
7
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claims subject to arbitration agreements. 14 Second, plaintiffs cannot bring group actions in arbitrations unless expressly permitted
by contract. 15 To prevent arbitrators from interpreting vague language in arbitration agreements to permit group actions in arbitration, 16 employers often include “class waivers,” which explicitly
preclude employees from joining claims. 17 In short, when arbitration agreements include class waivers, employees cannot bring
group actions via litigation or arbitration. And because Title VII
pattern-or-practice claims must be brought as group actions rather than as individual claims, arbitration agreements prevent
employees from bringing pattern-or-practice claims altogether.
In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 18 the Supreme Court
upheld the enforceability of class waivers in arbitration agreements, even where the waivers are unenforceable under state
law. 19 This decision created a new incentive for employers to include arbitration agreements in employees’ contracts—to avoid
class action suits. 20 Because it is not clear whether class waivers
outside arbitration agreements are enforceable, 21 employers
might use arbitration agreements not for any intrinsic benefits of
arbitration but to impede group litigation.
The same year that Jeffboat shuttered, the Supreme Court
held in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis 22 that arbitration agreements
could bar group wage-and-hour litigation, in which plaintiff
14F

15F

16F

17F

18F

19F

20F

21F

2F

collective action mechanism; “class action” for actions in court pursuant to Rule 23 or a
similar state rule; “class arbitration” for similar proceedings in arbitration; “collective action” for the group action device allowed by the Fair Labor Standards Act (see infra text
accompanying notes 88–90); and “group litigation” to refer to class actions, collective actions, and representative suits by organizations.
14 9 U.S.C. § 3; see also, e.g., Parisi v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 710 F.3d 483, 486 (2d
Cir. 2013).
15 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685 (2010).
16 See, e.g., Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 646 F.3d 113, 124 (2d Cir. 2011) (approving
an arbitrator’s interpretation of an agreement to permit class arbitration), aff’d, 942 F.3d
617, 623–24 (2d Cir. 2019).
17 See J. Maria Glover, Note, Beyond Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers and
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1735, 1742 (2006).
18 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
19 Id. at 352.
20 Arguably, the decision simply clarified existing law. But, in practice, use of arbitration agreements in adhesion contracts increased after Concepcion. See Sternlight, supra note 12, at 1344. Prior to Concepcion, contracts were often silent on the availability of
group action.
21 See generally, e.g., Jacqueline Prats, Are Arbitration Agreements Necessary for
Class-Action Waivers to Be Enforceable?, 92 FLA. BAR J., Nov./Dec. 2018, 64 (analyzing the
enforceability of class waivers as a matter of state law).
22 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
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employees sue to address minimum wage or overtime violations. 23
Employees argued that the right to pursue work-related group
litigation is protected by the National Labor Relations
Act 24 (NLRA), which insulates “concerted activities” pursued for
“mutual aid or protection” from employer interference. 25 They
contended that “concerted activities” included anything workers
did together to improve their working conditions—including resort to a judicial forum. 26 The Court disagreed: concerted activities are “things employees ‘just do’ for themselves,” a definition
which does not include group litigation. 27 Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg both dissented from the Court’s holding and explained
that she did not interpret its decision to reach employment discrimination class actions. 28 But strict enforcement of arbitration
agreements is in line with the federal courts’ jurisprudence. 29 Indeed, even prior to Epic Systems, the Second Circuit held that a
pattern-or-practice class action was barred where the named
plaintiff had agreed to mandatory arbitration. 30
Employers’ use of arbitration agreements is growing. According to a survey of employers, the share of workers subject to
mandatory arbitration agreements rose from just over 2% in 1992
23F

24F

25F

26F

27F

28F

29F

30F

23

Id. at 1632.
29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169.
25 Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1624 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 157).
26 See id. at 1636–37 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Eastex Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556,
565–67 (1978).
27 Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1625.
28 Id. at 1648 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“I do not read the Court’s opinion to place in
jeopardy discrimination complaints asserting disparate-impact and pattern-or-practice
claims that call for proof on a group-wide basis.”). Unlike pattern-or-practice claims, courts
have not limited the ability to bring disparate-impact claims to class plaintiffs. Christine
Tsang, Comment, Uncovering Systemic Discrimination: Allowing Individual Challenges
to a “Pattern or Practice”, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 319, 332 & n.68 (2013); cf. Melendez v.
Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 79 F.3d 661, 667–68 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining that an individual claimant does not face a higher bar than a class in proving a prima facie disparate-impact case
but must still satisfy individual standing requirements). The question may not arise often,
as individual disparate-impact suits are rare. For a discussion of the considerations that
bear on the choice of an individual or class action for plaintiffs who seek relief from a
generally applicable practice—including legal inconsistency regarding solo litigants’ access to system-wide relief—see Maureen Carroll, Aggregation for Me, but Not for Thee: The
Rise of Common Claims in Non-Class Litigation, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 2017, 2024–34 (2015).
29 See Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1627 (collecting cases in which the Court held that
statutory rights are subject to mandatory arbitration, often regardless of “a statute’s express provision for [group] actions”); see also Carson E. Miller, Note, Epic Systems Corp.
v. Lewis: Individual Arbitration and the Future of Title VII Disparate Impact and Patternor-Practice Class Actions, 87 U. CIN. L. REV. 1167, 1185 (2019) (arguing that the reasoning
in Epic Systems extends to Title VII cases).
30 Parisi, 710 F.3d at 488.
24
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to around 25% in the early 2000s to over 55% in 2017. 31 In 2017,
41% of such workers were additionally subject to class waivers; 32
use of such waivers may have increased after the Supreme Court
decided Epic Systems the following year. Mandatory arbitration
is more common in low-wage work and in industries with higher
proportions of women and Black workers. 33
Arbitration likely impedes the vindication of workers’
rights. 34 It may chill claims: according to one estimate, workers
arbitrate only 2% of the disputes that arise at their workplaces. 35
Though data on arbitration outcomes is sparse, researchers have
found that plaintiffs are less likely to win in arbitration. 36 When
they do, they recover less in damages. 37 And aside from leading to
worse outcomes in individual cases, arbitration makes it impossible for plaintiffs to pursue structural reform via class litigation. 38
As Professor Linda Hamilton Krieger put it, the law cannot be
used to “structure and reform institutionalized practices” when it
“disappears into secret private spaces.” 39
31F

32F

3F

34F

35F

36F

37F

38F

39F

31 ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POL’Y INST., THE GROWING USE OF MANDATORY
ARBITRATION 1 (2018), https://perma.cc/JA8Z-NMJ2.
32 Id. at 11; see also CARLTON FIELDS, THE 2020 CARLTON FIELDS CLASS ACTION
SURVEY 40 (2020) (finding that the percentage of companies using arbitral class waivers
increased from 16.1% in 2012 to 55.0% in 2019).
33 COLVIN, supra note 31, at 8–9.
34 Other commentators argue that arbitration has advantages for plaintiffs. See, e.g.,
Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 563–64 (2001) (arguing that arbitration increases access to justice for low-wage workers because it is
cheaper than litigation).
35 Cynthia Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C. L. REV. 679,
696 (2018). But see Samuel Estreicher, Michael Heise & David S. Sherwyn, Evaluating
Employment Arbitration: A Call for Better Empirical Research, 70 RUTGERS U. L. REV.
375, 397 n.149 (2018) (questioning Estlund’s methodology and underlying data). Given the
sparse data available, Estlund’s analysis relies on a number of assumptions, including
that workplaces see the same number of disputes regardless of whether they have mandatory arbitration regimes. Estlund, supra, at 696.
36 Estlund, supra note 35, at 688. But cf. Estreicher et al., supra note 35, at 382–86
(summarizing conflicting findings on win rates in arbitration and litigation).
37 Estlund, supra note 35, at 688; Estreicher et al., supra note 35, at 388–89 (noting
lower damage awards in arbitrations and suggesting that the trend may result from the
higher prevalence of arbitration in low-wage work or from plaintiffs’ lawyers litigating
only the strongest cases).
38 See Maureen Carroll, Class Action Myopia, 65 DUKE L.J. 843, 885–86 (2016).
39 Linda Hamilton Krieger, Message in a Bottle, 39 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 53,
75–78 (2018).
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Legislative strategies to limit arbitration have proved elusive. Federal law preempts direct efforts at the state level. 40 So
scholars have suggested creative workarounds for plaintiffs.
States could “deputize employees to enforce state laws” via qui
tam legislation, 41 private attorneys could do cheaper arbitrations
en masse by piggybacking on public court judgments, 42 or the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) could cocounsel with the private bar on significant claims. 43 Federal legislation would be more far-reaching. In 2021, two separate bills that
would ban mandatory arbitration in employment were introduced in the House of Representatives. 44 Their fate in the Senate
is uncertain.
In this Comment, I address the puzzle created by the intersection of mandatory individual adjudication in workplace arbitration and mandatory group treatment in some Title VII litigation. If Title VII pattern-or-practice claims must be individually
arbitrated, they cannot be brought at all. Either pattern-or-practice
litigation must be pursued collectively, regardless of individual
agreements that limit class proceedings, or it is individual, and
40F

41F

42F

43F

4F

40 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 341; see also, e.g., Chamber of Com. of the U.S. v. Becerra,
438 F. Supp. 3d 1078, 1100 (E.D. Cal. 2020), 9th Cir. argued Dec. 7, 2020 (enjoining the
enforcement of a California statute that prohibited contractual waivers of forum for state
statutory violations). For discussion of state legislative efforts, see Stephanie Greene &
Christine Neylon O’Brien, New Battles and Battlegrounds for Mandatory Arbitration After
Epic Systems, New Prime, and Lamps Plus, 56 AM. BUS. L.J. 815, 838–42 (2019); Kathleen
McCullough, Note, Mandatory Arbitration and Sexual Harassment Claims: #MeToo- and
Time’s Up-Inspired Action Against the Federal Arbitration Act, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2653,
2677–83 (2019). A #MeToo-inspired Illinois law that limits mandatory arbitration, the
Workplace Transparency Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 96/1-25(b) (2020), may be preempted
as well, but the question has not yet been litigated. See Jessica Golden Cortes & Sharon
Cohen, Illinois Workplace Transparency Act Goes into Effect January 1, 2020, MONDAQ
(Dec. 16, 2019), https://perma.cc/FWC5-D267.
41 Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, The New Qui Tam: A Model for the Enforcement
of Group Rights in a Hostile Era, 98 TEX. L. REV. 489, 514–16, 527–28 (2020). Under California’s Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA), CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2698–99.6 (2020), employees can bring representative suits for labor violations. Arbitration agreements do not
preclude PAGA actions. Rivas v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 842 F. App’x 55, 56 (9th Cir. 2021).
42 Myriam Gilles & Anthony Sebok, Crowd-Classing Individual Arbitrations in a
Post-Class Action Era, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 447, 468 (2014).
43 Stephanie Bornstein, Rights in Recession: Toward Administrative Antidiscrimination Law, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV 119, 168–69 (2014); see also EEOC v. Waffle House,
Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 291–92, 296 (2002) (holding that the government can enforce antidiscrimination law notwithstanding arbitration agreements).
44 Levi Sumagaysay, FAIR Act Is Being Revived in Washington, Raising Hopes for
End to Forced Arbitration, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 11, 2021), https://perma.cc/4KW5-4BN7;
Alan I. Model, Kevin E. Burke, Maury Baskin & Michael J. Lotito, PRO Act Would Upend
U.S. Labor Laws for Non-union and Unionized Employers Alike, LITTLER (Feb. 10, 2021),
https://perma.cc/GX4A-259V.
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there is no reason to limit pattern-or-practice litigation to classes.
Otherwise, employers would essentially be able to contract out of
private antidiscrimination enforcement.
Epic Systems should not be extended to Title VII pattern-orpractice claims. As in other concerted activities, pattern-or-practice
plaintiffs try to change workplace practices—just through a court
order, rather than a strike or collective bargaining. The Supreme
Court’s skepticism about the concertedness of group litigation can
be answered without leaving all workplace litigation unprotected.
Courts should scrutinize litigating groups to determine whether
their particular litigation activity is protected by the NLRA.
Adapting a test from securities law, I argue that if a group attempting to litigate a pattern-or-practice lawsuit predates the litigation, it should be able to obtain prospective injunctive relief in
court, followed by arbitrations to adjudicate individual damages.
This Comment proceeds in two parts. In Part I, I explain the
relevant aspects of workplace regulation and the Supreme Court’s
arbitration jurisprudence. In Part II, I evaluate ways of resolving
the tension between Epic Systems and pattern-or-practice’s class
limitation. First, I argue that removing the class limitation would
be inconsistent with Title VII. Allowing groups to seek relief for
discriminatory treatment is necessary to achieve Title VII’s goal
of remediating group-based social stratification. Next, I argue
that Epic Systems should not be categorically extended to Title VII.
Instead, courts should decide whether litigation is a concerted activity on a case-by-case basis.
I. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF WORKPLACE REGULATION
In this Part, I review the pieces at play in the application of
Epic Systems to Title VII pattern-or-practice claims. First, I survey the relevant workplace-regulation statutes—Title VII, the
primary federal employment-discrimination law; the Fair Labor
Standards Act 45 (FLSA), under which the Epic Systems plaintiffs’
substantive wage-and-hour claims arose; and the NLRA, which
protects employees’ group activity. Then, I turn to the Federal
Arbitration Act 46 (FAA), which now channels many employment
claims into arbitration. A few courts, including the Second Circuit,
have found that Title VII pattern-or-practice claims are subject to
45F

46F

45
46

29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219.
Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16, 201–208).
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mandatory arbitration as well. 47 Finally, I examine Epic Systems
itself. I argue that the holding does not necessarily reach beyond
the FLSA to Title VII pattern-or-practice claims.
47F

A.

Workplace Regulation Statutes
1. Systemic discrimination and Title VII.

Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 48 in
order to “eradicat[e] discrimination throughout the economy” and
provide relief “for injuries suffered through past discrimination.” 49 Under the statute, employers may not hire, fire, or otherwise treat employees differently based on their race, religion, sex,
gender identity, sexual orientation, or national origin. 50
Title VII has a mixed enforcement regime: there is both a private right of action and a public enforcer. A would-be plaintiff
must file a charge with the EEOC, which investigates the complaint and, if there is “reasonable cause to believe that the charge
is true,” tries to resolve the dispute through “informal methods of
conference, conciliation, and persuasion.” 51 If conciliation fails,
the EEOC can sue the employer in federal court. 52 But if the agency
dismisses the complaint or does not sue, the employee may sue. 53
In practice, the EEOC rarely litigates. In each year between
2000 and 2013, private plaintiffs filed an average of fifty-five
times as many employment discrimination lawsuits as the
EEOC. 54 The reliance on private litigation rather than public enforcement is part of the statutory scheme. Congress wanted to
“limit[ ] the EEOC’s reach” by delegating adjudication to courts
and not agencies. 55 Congress may have feared losing control over
48F

49F

50F

51F

52F

53F

54F

5F

47

See Parisi v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 710 F.3d 483, 488 (2d Cir. 2013).
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a–
2000h-6).
49 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975).
50 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); see also Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737
(2020) (holding that Title VII’s protections based on sex extend to gender identity and sexual
orientation).
51 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(b).
52 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(f)(1)–(2).
53 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(f)(1).
54 Bornstein, supra note 43, at 130. These figures include claims under Title VII as
well as other federal employment-discrimination statutes.
55 Id. at 131; see also SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION
AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 117–18 (2010).
48
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Title VII’s enforcement if it were left solely to the president without the backstop of private suits. 56
Systemic discrimination at a company can be addressed
through pattern-or-practice litigation. 57 A pattern or practice exists when a business’s discriminatory practices are “standard operating procedure—the regular rather than the unusual practice.” 58 In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, 59 the Supreme Court established a two-part burden-shifting
framework for pattern-or-practice cases. First, in the liability
phase, plaintiffs “establish a prima facie case that such a policy
existed,” 60 usually via a combination of statistical and anecdotal
evidence. 61 After a prima facie showing, the court can order prospective relief, such as an injunction forbidding the discriminatory practice or requiring the employer to adopt an affirmative
action program. 62 Next, in the remedial phase, potential victims
may obtain individualized damages. The prima facie showing
from the liability phase establishes a presumption that every
member of the relevant group was a victim of illegal discrimination, but the employer can “demonstrate that [an] individual [ ]
was denied an employment opportunity for lawful reasons,” preventing individualized relief for that employee or job applicant. 63
Pattern-or-practice claims can be brought by the government
or as private class actions. Technically, the statutory text only expressly authorizes the government to bring these claims: the attorney general may “bring a civil action” to enforce Title VII when
an employer “is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance” to
the statutory rights. 64 This responsibility was transferred to the
56F

57F

58F

59F

60F

61F

62F

63F

64F

56

FARHANG, supra note 55, at 121–22, 164–65.
Plaintiffs also use disparate-impact theories of discrimination. Because courts
have not expressly limited disparate-impact litigation to classes, this Comment does not
focus on it. See supra note 28.
58 International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1976).
59 431 U.S. 324 (1976).
60 Id. at 360.
61 Id. at 339–40.
62 Id. at 361. Title VII injunctions can be retrospective (for example, reinstating an
illegally fired employee) or prospective (for example, a requirement that an employer
change its seniority system). Typically, individual remedies are retrospective and group
remedies are prospective. See Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 158 F.3d 742, 761 (4th
Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999).
63 Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 361–62; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 366–
67 (2011).
64 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a).
57
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EEOC via the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972’s 65
amendments to the Civil Rights Act. 66
Yet courts allow private plaintiffs to bring pattern-or-practice
claims as well. The Supreme Court has explained that “the elements of a prima facie pattern-or-practice case are the same in a
private class action” as in a suit by the government. 67 A private
pattern-or-practice claim is not an independent cause of action
under Title VII. Rather, private plaintiffs have access to the same
burden-shifting framework that allows the government to remediate discriminatory practices without showing individualized
harm. 68 One commentator suggested that the Supreme Court extended the pattern-or-practice method to private plaintiffs in an
“attempt to create workable standards and evidentiary requirements for challenges against systemic discrimination.” 69 Regardless, recent Supreme Court cases have confirmed that class plaintiffs can bring Title VII pattern-or-practice claims. 70
However, it is likely that only classes can pursue these
claims. All circuits to consider the issue have ruled that private
pattern-or-practice claims cannot be brought by individual plaintiffs; they can only be brought as class actions. 71 For example, in
Davis v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 72 the Eleventh Circuit explained
that class certification is necessary in such cases because it avoids
the “res judicata and collateral estoppel issues that would arise”
absent the procedural protections of Rule 23. 73 The Tenth Circuit
likewise explained that these claims, “by their very nature, involve claims of classwide discrimination” and use a different
65F

6F

67F

68F

69F

70F

71F

72F

73F

65

Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c)).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c).
67 Cooper v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 876 n.9 (1984).
68 See Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 685 F.3d 135, 147–49, 149 n.8 (2d Cir. 2012).
69 Tsang, supra note 28, at 321; see also Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S.
747, 763–66 (1976) (explaining that Congress intended courts to fashion broad prospective
relief for Title VII violations). In contrast, Krieger argues that courts’ drawing of increasingly sharp distinctions between pattern-or-practice and other methods of proof under
Title VII is a way of reining in antidiscrimination litigation. Krieger, supra note 39, at 58
n.23, 67–68.
70 See, e.g., Dukes, 564 U.S. at 352–53 (2011) (explaining that plaintiffs seeking class
certification in a pattern-or-practice suit must show that the causes of all adverse employment decisions were connected).
71 See Daniels v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 701 F.3d 620, 632 (10th Cir. 2012); Chin,
685 F.3d at 149–50; Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 516 F.3d 955, 967–69 (11th Cir. 2008);
Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg., 370 F.3d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 2004); Celestine v. Petroleos de
Venez. SA, 266 F.3d 343, 355–56 (5th Cir. 2001); Lowery, 158 F.3d at 760–62; Babrocky v.
Jewel Food Co. & Retail Meatcutters Union, Local 320, 773 F.2d 857, 866 n.6 (7th Cir. 1985).
72 516 F.3d 955 (11th Cir. 2008).
73 Id. at 968–69.
66
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method of proof than that used in individual discrimination
cases. 74 District courts have allowed nonclass groups—including
a union, 75 an unincorporated organization of past and present
Black employees, 76 and a local NAACP chapter 77—to participate
in pattern-or-practice suits as well.
74F

75F

76F

7F

2. The FLSA: procedures and remedies.
Like Title VII, the FLSA gives individual employees legal
rights at work. The FLSA establishes a right to a minimum
wage 78 and overtime pay. 79 Group litigation under the FLSA differs from group litigation under Title VII in two critical ways.
First, unlike in Title VII litigation, FLSA plaintiffs cannot win
prospective injunctive relief to change their employers’ business
practices. 80 Second, FLSA group litigation is governed by a “collective action,” a procedural device that Congress and the Supreme Court have treated differently from a class action. 81 Under
most statutes, including Title VII but excluding the FLSA, plaintiffs aggregate claims using Rule 23 class actions. 82
Private plaintiffs cannot obtain injunctive relief in FLSA
suits. The FLSA’s text limits injunctive relief to actions brought
by the government, 83 and courts have declined to extend it to private FLSA plaintiffs. 84 This interpretation has been subject to
criticism. A commentator calling for amendments to the FLSA explained that “wage theft [is] a fundamentally systemic problem
that—like Title VII—requires restructuring employer practices.” 85 But so far, Congress has refused to give workers the same
78F

79F

80F

81F

82F

83F

84F

85F

74

Daniels, 701 F.3d at 633 (quoting Babrocky, 773 F.2d at 866 n.6).
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees Division v. Ind. Harbor Belt R.R.
Co., No. 13 CV 18, 2014 WL 4987972, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 7, 2014).
76 Emps. Committed for Just. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 407 F. Supp. 2d 423, 435
(W.D.N.Y. 2005).
77 Welch v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 06-cv-0641, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61648, at *19–20
(S.D. Ind. Aug. 7, 2008).
78 29 U.S.C. § 206(a).
79 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).
80 29 U.S.C. § 211(a).
81 See Genesis HealthCare Corp. v Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 73–74 (2013).
82 See, e.g., Franks, 424 U.S. at 747.
83 29 U.S.C. §§ 211(a), 217.
84 See, e.g., Powell v. Florida, 132 F.3d 677, 678 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding thus and
collecting cases); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978) (noting agreement among
lower courts that “injunctive relief [is] not available in suits by private individuals” under
the FLSA).
85 Jordan Laris Cohen, Note, Democratizing the FLSA Injunction: Toward a Systemic
Remedy for Wage Theft, 127 YALE L.J. 706, 717 (2018).
75
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rights to restructure wage-and-hour practices as it has given for
discriminatory practices via Title VII. 86
Collective actions are easier to certify than class actions are. 87
But once certified, they do not facilitate group litigation to the
same extent. Whereas classes include anyone who fits the class
definition and does not opt out, 88 FLSA collective actions include
only similarly situated coworkers who opt in. 89 In 1947, Congress
eliminated FLSA class actions and representative actions—suits
brought by a representative, such as a union, that was not itself
an employee. 90
The Supreme Court has recognized important differences between the collective and class action devices. In Genesis
HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk, 91 the Court ruled that an FLSA collective action becomes nonjusticiable when a named plaintiff’s
case is mooted. 92 In contrast, class actions are excepted from normal mootness rules. 93 Unlike Rule 23 certification, FLSA certification “does not produce a class with an independent legal status,
or join additional parties to the action.” 94 A collective action brings
legally separate actions together into one case, while a class action creates a new, formally independent legal entity.
86F

87F

8F

89F

90F

91F

92F

93F

94F

86

For discussion of private Title VII injunctions, see infra Part II.A.1.
The majority rule is that the FLSA’s “similarly situated” standard is a lower bar
than commonality and predominance in Rule 23. See Scott v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.,
954 F.3d 502, 518–20 (2nd Cir. 2020) (holding thus and collecting cases from the Third,
Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits). The Seventh Circuit merges the certification standards. Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 705 F.3d 770, 772 (7th Cir. 2013).
88 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3). “Injunction” classes certified under 23(b)(2) do not even
require opt-out.
89 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
90 Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-49, § 5(a), 61 Stat. 84, 87 (codified at
29 U.S.C. § 216(b)); Hoffman-LaRoche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 173 (1989); see also
Marc Linder, Class Struggle at the Door: The Origins of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947,
39 BUFF. L. REV. 53, 172, 167 (1991) (explaining that the amendment was “an attack on
union-organized litigation,” but it primarily “injured unorganized workers”).
91 569 U.S. 66 (2013).
92 Id. at 73–74 (“Rule 23 actions are fundamentally different from collective actions
under the FLSA.” (citing Hoffman-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 177–78 (Scalia, J., dissenting))).
93 See Franks, 424 U.S. at 754–56 (explaining that a class action still presents a live
case or controversy even if a named plaintiff’s “personal stake” has become moot).
94 Genesis, 569 U.S. at 75; see also Hoffman-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 177–78 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that, unlike in class actions, potential coplaintiffs in collective actions are simply “members of the public at large,” not absent parties).
87
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3. Concerted activities under the NLRA.
Whereas Title VII and the FLSA create individual employment rights, the NLRA creates a right to group activity. 95 The
statute sets out a framework “to safeguard the right of employees
to self-organization,” 96 including procedures for union elections
and collective bargaining. 97 The NLRA also established an
agency, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), to adjudicate disputes and monitor compliance with the statute. 98 Section 7
of the NLRA guarantees employees “the right to self-organization,
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection.” 99 It is an “unfair labor practice”
for employers to “interfere with” or “restrain” those § 7 rights. 100
The NLRB can prevent unfair labor practices regardless of a private agreement establishing an alternate dispute-resolution
mechanism. 101 Thus, if group litigation were a concerted activity
under § 7, the NLRB could prevent employers from compelling
arbitration to restrain it.
To sum up the statutes discussed in this section: Title VII
protects employees from discrimination. Employees can bring
class actions under the statute to remediate a pattern or practice
of discrimination. The FLSA uses collective (as opposed to class)
actions to vindicate employees’ rights to a minimum wage and
overtime. And the NLRA protects, via a powerful agency, the
right of employees to participate in concerted activities related to
self-organization. The scope of concerted activities protected by
the NLRA is vital to arguments later in this Comment. In
Part I.C, I argue that Epic Systems—in which the Supreme Court
held that FLSA collective actions are not concerted activities—
95F

96F

97F

98F

9F

10F

10F

95 This is the traditional distinction between employment law and labor law—an individual rights regime compared to a collective one—but the two systems have porous
boundaries. See Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV.
2685, 2701–07 (2008).
96 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937).
97 29 U.S.C. § 159.
98 29 U.S.C. § 153.
99 29 U.S.C. § 157 (emphasis added).
100 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
101 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (“Th[e] power [to prevent unfair labor practices] shall not be
affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention . . . established by agreement,
law, or otherwise.”); see also, e.g., Square D Co. v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 360, 364 (9th Cir. 1964)
(explaining that the NLRB has jurisdiction over unfair labor practices regardless of private agreements that require arbitration of disputes).
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can be cabined to the FLSA. In Part II, I argue that some Title VII
pattern-or-practice litigation is a concerted activity protected by
the NLRA. But before returning to the NLRA and FLSA in the
discussion of Epic Systems, I detour to the third statute implicated in the decision—the Federal Arbitration Act.
B.

The Federal Arbitration Act and the Supreme Court’s
Arbitration Jurisprudence

Employers often avoid employee group litigation—whether
under the FLSA, Title VII, or similar state laws—by using arbitration agreements. Congress passed the FAA in 1925, in response to the tendency of “common law courts” to “refuse[ ] to enforce agreements to arbitrate disputes.” 102 Under the FAA, courts
must treat written agreements to arbitrate as presumptively
valid, except “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.” 103 If a party tries to litigate claims
covered by the agreement in federal court, the court must stay the
proceedings. 104 If one party refuses to arbitrate, the other party
can obtain a federal court order to compel arbitration. 105
The FAA’s framers likely envisioned it only “as applying to
consensual transactions between two merchants of roughly equal
bargaining power”—and not to employment contracts at all. 106
The Supreme Court’s early FAA jurisprudence limited its
reach. 107 In Wilko v. Swan, 108 the Court held that an arbitration
agreement could not waive a judicial forum for vindicating a statutory right. 109 As late as 1974, the Court ruled that arbitrating a
discriminatory firing under the terms in a collective bargaining
agreement did not preclude a Title VII suit. 110
102F

103F

104F

105F

106F

107F

108F

109F

10F

102

Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1621.
9 U.S.C. § 2.
104 9 U.S.C. § 3.
105 9 U.S.C. § 4.
106 Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 647 (1996); Gilmer v. Interstate
/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 39 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107 Sternlight, supra note 106, at 648–49.
108 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989).
109 Id. at 438.
110 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59–60 (1974).
103
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Yet, starting in the 1980s, the Supreme Court carved out a
larger space for arbitration. 111 The Court overruled Wilko in 1989,
holding that statutory claims must be arbitrated if parties agreed
to it. 112 In addition, arbitration agreements that preclude class actions must be enforced, even if they impair the “effective vindication” of a statutory right by making it uneconomical to pursue on
an individual basis. 113
In AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, the Court held that class
waivers in arbitration agreements must be enforced. 114 The Court
overruled a California decision that was preempted by the FAA.
In Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 115 the California Supreme
Court had ruled that class waivers in some consumer contracts
are unconscionable. They effect an “exemption” from wrongdoing
because disputes that involve “large numbers of consumers” and
“individually small sums of money” will not be litigated outside
class actions. 116 The Supreme Court explained that California’s
unconscionability interpretation was inconsistent with the FAA
because individual adjudication is a “fundamental attribute[ ] of
arbitration.” 117 Arbitration agreements cannot be set aside on
grounds that apply only to arbitration, as opposed to grounds for
invalidating any contract. 118 For example, arbitration agreements
are invalid if they were procured by fraud or duress but not if
state legislators or judges disfavor arbitration for policy
1F

12F

13F

14F

15F

16F

17F

18F

111 See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)
(declaring “a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements”); Sternlight, supra
note 12, at 1317; Bornstein, supra note 43, at 146–49; Estreicher et al., supra note 35, at
377–79. Commentators have attributed the shift in FAA jurisprudence to conservatives’
desire to rein in the “litigation explosion” created by new rights of action, fee-shifting provisions, and procedural innovations in the 1960s and 1970s, which they felt served liberal
goals. E.g., Myriam Gilles, The Day Doctrine Died: Private Arbitration and the End of Law,
2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 371, 378, 381–82 (2016); see also Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S.
Ct. 1407, 1435 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence as reflecting negative policy judgments about class actions). But see Quijas, 490 U.S.
at 480–81 (explaining that the Court’s earlier jurisprudence reflected outdated judicial
hostility to arbitration).
112 Quijas, 490 U.S. at 485.
113 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 235 (2013).
114 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352.
115 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
116 Id. at 1110; Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 340.
117 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344, 347–48. Parties can agree to class arbitration, but
“class-action arbitration changes the nature of arbitration to such a degree that it cannot
be presumed the parties consented to it by simply agreeing to” arbitration. Stolt-Nielsen
S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685 (2010).
118 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339, 341.
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reasons. 119 Because California’s Discover Bank rule rested on the
fact that the agreements required individual adjudications, the
rule targeted arbitration and was preempted by the FAA. 120
The Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration jurisprudence now extends to employment-law claims too. In Gilmer v. Interstate
/Johnson Lane Corp., 121 the Court ruled that age-discrimination
claims are subject to mandatory arbitration. 122 The Court found
that the EEOC’s role in facilitating conciliations showed that
“out-of-court dispute resolution, such as arbitration, is consistent
with the statutory scheme.” 123 The Court ruled in Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams 124 that the FAA’s exception for employment
contracts 125 applies only to transportation workers, 126 an issue
that was waived in Gilmer. 127 The Court has also held that individual discrimination claims cannot be litigated if a collective bargaining agreement expressly requires arbitration of such
claims. 128 Though arbitration of employment-related claims usually arises from clauses in employment contracts, claims of discriminatory nonhiring are subject to arbitration as well if the job
application contained an arbitration agreement. 129 The Supreme
Court has never directly ruled on whether Title VII class actions
are subject to mandatory arbitration, but Gilmer and Concepcion
would seem to apply to all employment-related claims. Epic
Systems, discussed next, would only solidify that interpretation.
19F

120F

12F

12F

123F

124F

125F

126F

127F

128F

129F

C.

Cabining Epic Systems

With the statutes on the table, we turn in earnest to Epic
Systems. In this case, the Supreme Court held that FLSA plaintiffs must individually arbitrate their claims, despite the NLRA’s
protection for group activity. 130 Read broadly—to apply to all
workplace litigation—Epic Systems would preclude Part II of this
130F

119

Id. at 339.
Id. at 352.
121 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
122 Id. at 23.
123 Id. at 29.
124 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
125 9 U.S.C. § 1 (“[N]othing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment
of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”).
126 Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 109.
127 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2.
128 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 251 (2009).
129 See, e.g., Valentin v. Adecco, 777 F. App’x 50, 51 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam).
130 Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1632.
120
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Comment, which argues that some Title VII pattern-or-practice
cases must be litigated notwithstanding arbitration agreements.
I argue for a narrow reading of Epic Systems. FLSA litigation is
a particularly poor candidate for NLRA protection, because plaintiffs can neither change workplace practices prospectively nor use
a class action.
First, I explain the two bases for the Court’s decision. The
Court held that FLSA collective actions are not concerted activities 131 and that, even if they were, Concepcion would have required arbitration of the plaintiffs’ claims. 132 Next, to the first basis of the decision, I argue that some protection for group
litigation under the NLRA survives Epic Systems. Then, I explain
that the basis resting on Concepcion is dicta; only the narrowest
holding in Epic Systems is necessary to the decision. If group litigation were protected, the NLRA would preclude the application
of Concepcion in some circumstances.
13F

132F

1. The Court’s holding.
In Epic Systems, the Supreme Court interpreted the NLRA’s
“concerted activities” to exclude FLSA collective actions. The
Court explained that the phrase must be read in context. Textually, “concerted activities” in § 7 ends a list which focuses on union
membership and collective bargaining, suggesting it should only
cover things similar to those activities. 133 Structurally, the NLRA
includes a specific “regulatory regime” for each activity in the list,
but no regime relates to group litigation. 134 Thus, the category
should be construed to cover only “things employees ‘just do’ for
themselves in the course of exercising their right to free association in the workplace”—not “highly regulated, courtroom-bound
‘activities’” like group litigation. 135 The decision implies that
strikes, picketing, and NLRB proceedings are concerted activities
13F

134F

135F

131

Id. at 1625.
Id. at 1622.
133 Id. at 1625.
134 Id. But see id. at 1639 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (countering that some items
gained specific statutory guidance only via amendments).
135 Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1625 (quoting NLRB v. Alt. Ent., Inc., 858 F.3d 393,
414–15 (6th Cir. 2017) (Sutton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis
omitted)).
132
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because of their close relationship to expressly protected labor
organizing. 136
In addition, the Court suggested that, even if it had interpreted “concerted activities” to include FLSA litigation, the arbitration agreements still would have controlled. The Court explained that, “by attacking (only) the individualized nature of the
arbitration proceedings, the employees’ argument seeks to interfere with one of arbitration’s fundamental attributes.” 137 In other
words, to the Court, the plaintiffs were trying to transform § 7
into something quite like the Discover Bank rule invalidated in
Concepcion—a limit on arbitration that gains its meaning from
the fact that arbitration requires individual adjudications. If
plaintiffs cannot use generally applicable contract defenses to invalidate the agreement, they would need to show that the NLRA
contains a “clearly expressed congressional intention” to suspend
the FAA. 138 The Court found that the NLRA Congress did not suspend the FAA, but for the same reason as the first basis of the
decision—that § 7 does not protect FLSA collective actions. 139
Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, criticized the majority’s reasoning and cautioned lower courts against reading the decision too
broadly. The dissent pointed out that the majority did not explain
why “things employees just do” excludes group litigation. 140 After
all, collective bargaining, like litigation, is highly formalized and
conducted through representatives. And the dissent would have
easily resolved the conflict with Concepcion: agreements that violate federal law are invalid, as “[i]llegality is a traditional, generally applicable contract defense.” 141 In addition to criticizing the
decision, Justice Ginsburg argued that it did not reach antidiscrimination “pattern-or-practice claims that call for proof on a
136F

137F

138F

139F

140F

14F

136 Id. at 1625. In a decision about confidentiality provisions, the NLRB interpreted
the Court’s distinction to be that the NLRA protects activity which employees pursue
organically (like “[c]ommunicating with each other about events, facts, and circumstances
they either know about firsthand or have heard about from their colleagues”) but not activity collateral to formal procedures (like “disseminating evidence or information obtained solely through participating as a party in an arbitral proceeding”). Cal. Com. Club,
369 N.L.R.B. No. 106, at 6 (June 19, 2020). This, too, is dissatisfying; collective bargaining
and NLRB adjudicatory proceedings are quite formal.
137 Id. at 1622.
138 Id. at 1623–24 (quoting Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515
U.S. 528, 533 (1995)).
139 Id. at 1624.
140 Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1638 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 1645.
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group-wide basis.” 142 To justify a narrow scope for the decision,
Justice Ginsburg explained that “concerted legal actions” have
been essential to effective enforcement of antidiscrimination law 143
and pointed out the class limitation on pattern-or-practice claims
discussed above. 144 The majority did not engage with Justice
Ginsburg’s discussion of the extension of the decision to antidiscrimination law.
142F

143F

14F

2. Some group litigation survives Epic Systems.
Like Justice Ginsburg, this Comment argues that Epic Systems
is limited to the FLSA. Many courts have interpreted it as a categorical rejection of all group litigation from the concerted-activity
category. 145 Such interpretations are incorrect for two reasons.
First, the FLSA can be distinguished from other work-related
group litigation. Second, the Court’s analysis of concerted activities suggests the need for a case-specific inquiry into whether litigation is protected.
The FLSA is distinguishable from other statutes on grounds
pertinent to the concerted-activity analysis. Workers engage in
concerted activities—joining unions, collectively bargaining, or
going on strike—in order to change workplace conditions through
negotiation or social pressure. Wage-and-hour plaintiffs cannot
achieve that goal in federal courts because the FLSA lacks private
injunctive relief. 146 When plaintiffs can win prospective injunctive
relief—like in Title VII cases—litigation can change workplace
conditions, more plausibly suggesting NLRA protection. In addition, the formal nature of collective actions justifies a different
result for class action litigation. 147 The Genesis Court explained
that a class action creates an entity with an “independent legal
145F

146F

147F

142

Id. at 1648.
Id.
144 See supra text accompanying notes 71–77.
145 See, e.g., Williams v. Dearborn Motors 1, LLC (Dearborn II), No. 17-12724, 2018
WL 3870068, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 15, 2018). (applying Epic Systems in a Title VII suit);
Bekele v. Lyft, Inc., 918 F.3d 181, 186 (1st Cir. 2019) (applying it in an employee misclassification suit); Singh v. Uber Techs. Inc., 939 F.3d 210, 215–16, 217 n.1 (3d Cir. 2019)
(same); see also Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1620 (noting that one of the cases under consideration included a collective action and a class action for similar state law claims).
146 See supra text accompanying notes 83–86.
147 But see Alt. Ent., 858 F.3d at 414 (Sutton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (explaining that “a lawsuit to achieve more favorable terms of employment” is a concerted activity because “workers mutually plan and support it,” not because of “the particular procedural form that litigation takes”), overruled by Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. 1612.
143
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status,” but a collective action does not. 148 A certified class proceeds in court as an independent, unitary entity, whereas collective action plaintiffs maintain their status as individual litigants.
An FLSA litigating group is not formally independent and is easier to certify than a class, 149 justifying less judicial protection of
the group’s litigation activity.
The Court’s mode of analysis in Epic Systems suggests that
features of the particular litigating group—aside from the substantive law at issue—bear on whether litigation activity is protected.
If there is a valid distinction to be drawn between “courtroombound activities” and “things employees ‘just do’ for themselves,”
it implies that the relevant analytical focus is not the formal
structure of group litigation, but its social reality. Group litigation is often not something employees decide on as an independent
collective; it is driven by plaintiffs’ attorneys’ strategic decisions. 150 Yet that functional approach implies that when employees in fact pursue collective litigation organically, their activity
might be protected.
148F

149F

150F

3. Concepcion does not apply to litigation protected by § 7.
One might argue that even if some group litigation were a
concerted activity, Epic Systems would require arbitration in
those cases anyway. The majority indicated that if the NLRA protected plaintiffs from arbitration, it would conflict with the FAA
as interpreted in Concepcion. 151 Then, plaintiffs would need to
show that the NLRA suspended the FAA. But the majority found
that the NLRA did not suspend the FAA precisely because of its
finding that § 7 did not include a right to an FLSA collective action. 152 Were § 7 to protect group litigation, the result of a statutory conflicts analysis would differ. Indeed, the dissent would
have found that, because any illegal contract can be set aside, the
plaintiffs’ argument is permissible under the FAA’s savings
clause—an illegal agreement is unenforceable. 153 But a court
would not need to adopt the dissent’s view to find that the NLRA
15F

152F

153F

148

Genesis, 569 U.S. at 75.
See supra note 87.
150 See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Together: Social, Moral, and Legal
Obligations, 91 B.U. L. REV. 87, 109–11 (2011) (“To justify collective (sometimes mandatory) treatment of present-day class members, modern courts presume group cohesion,”
but “this cohesion is often a convenient fiction.”).
151 See supra text accompanying notes 138–39.
152 Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1624.
153 Id. at 1645 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
149
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trumps the FAA here. The text of § 10 of the NLRA effects a suspension of the FAA. The NLRB’s power to enjoin an unfair labor
practice “shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment
. . . established by agreement.” 154 If mandatory arbitration were
an unfair labor practice, defendants could be enjoined from moving to compel arbitration regardless of private agreements. 155
154F

15F

***
After Epic Systems, the NLRA does not protect a group of
workers who seek redress for wage-and-hour violations in court.
If they signed arbitration agreements, they will be sent to individual adjudications. But workers who seek prospective relief for
a pattern or practice of discrimination in violation of Title VII
may still be protected. Like bargaining, strikes, and other concerted activities, litigation can help them win changes to the
workplace.
So far, however, courts have largely deferred to arbitration
agreements in Title VII pattern-or-practice cases. Before Epic
Systems, in Parisi v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 156 the Second Circuit
explained that, because there is no independent “right to bring a
substantive ‘pattern-or-practice’ claim”—rather, it is just “a
method of proof”—it does not infringe a plaintiff’s statutory
rights to require individual arbitration. 157 The court explained
that pattern-or-practice is merely a procedural device that arises
from the class action mechanism. In fact, if Rule 23 were to “create a non-waivable, substantive right,” it would violate the Rules
Enabling Act. 158 Similarly, a district court in the First Circuit explained that the pattern-or-practice device is a “relatively minor
procedural difference” that is unlikely to change a case’s outcome,
so arbitration that precludes a pattern-or-practice claim is
156F

157F

158F

154

29 U.S.C. § 160(a).
Taken formalistically, this analysis might suggest that whether the NLRA precludes arbitration would depend on a case’s procedural posture. In cases where plaintiffs
file a charge at the NLRB to prevent defendants’ motion to compel arbitration in parallel
litigation in federal court, for example, Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013,
1016 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d sub nom., Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018), the NLRB would
be able to enjoin mandatory arbitration. But the same argument may be precluded by the
FAA if the argument were a defense to a motion to compel arbitration. See, e.g., Lewis v.
Epic Systems Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir. 2016), overruled by Epic Systems, 128
S. Ct. 1612; Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2015), overruled by
Epic Systems, 128 S. Ct. 1612.
156 710 F.3d 483 (2d Cir. 2013).
157 Id. at 487–88 (quoting Chin, 685 F.3d at 149 n.8).
158 Id. at 488.
155
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appropriate. 159 After Epic Systems, a district court interpreted the
decision to reach Title VII pattern-or-practice claims as well. 160
These decisions impair workers’ ability to act together to
change their workplaces—something that the NLRA expressly
protects. And the characterization of pattern-or-practice as
merely procedural conflicts with rulings regarding its class limitation, in which courts explain that the mechanism allows employer liability with less proof. 161 In Part II, I argue that courts
can give effect to the NLRA without eviscerating arbitration
agreements by examining how concerted a particular plaintiff
group’s litigation activity is. I suggest that courts adapt tests
from securities law to evaluate plaintiff groups for cohesion and
independence.
159F

160F

16F

II. EVALUATING THE GROUP ACTIVITY OF PATTERN-OR-PRACTICE
PLAINTIFFS
The pattern-or-practice mechanism gives plaintiffs substantial litigative power. The court can halt discriminatory business
practices after plaintiffs prove preliminary liability, without any
showing of individualized harm. Its limitation to classes—empowering groups instead of individuals—stands in tension with
the Second Circuit’s holding in Parisi that such actions can be
prevented by arbitration agreements that bar individual claims.
This Part explores the two primary ways courts could address
this concern and argues that only the second is consistent with
Title VII.
First, courts could hold that “there is no substantive statutory right to pursue a pattern-or-practice claim.” 162 But that bare
holding leaves the doctrine unsettled. Post-Parisi, it is unclear
why individual and class plaintiffs should be treated differently. 163
Either classes should not be able to use the pattern-or-practice
mechanism, which would conflict with the goals of Title VII, or individual plaintiffs should have access to it as well, which would
create procedural issues.
162F

163F

159

Karp v. Cigna Healthcare, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 199, 213 (D. Mass. 2012).
Dearborn II, 2018 WL 3870068, at *2–3 (order denying plaintiffs’ motion for
reconsideration).
161 See Chin, 685 F.3d at 149.
162 Parisi, 710 F.3d at 486.
163 In fact, even as it required arbitration of a pattern-or-practice claim, one court
noted that it was perpetuating an “arbitrary and illogical” distinction between individual
and class plaintiffs. Karp v. Cigna Healthcare, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 199, 213 (D. Mass. 2012).
160
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Second, courts could rule that sufficient group cohesion
among plaintiffs brings Title VII pattern-or-practice litigation
under the § 7 concerted-activities umbrella sought by the Epic
Systems plaintiffs. A litigating group that is acting together to
vindicate Title VII rights cannot be prevented from group litigation by arbitration agreements because of the NLRA’s protections
for concerted activities. This Part proposes a test to gauge sufficient group cohesion. When a litigating group predates the lawsuit, courts should presume that such cohesion exists.
A.

The Wrong Result: Killing Off the Private Pattern-orPractice Suit

Courts could rule that groups cannot bring pattern-or-practice
claims, insofar as such claims differ from other private claims under Title VII. On this view, Title VII class actions merely aggregate individual claims: the term “pattern or practice” in the case
law simply refers to modes of proof that are more efficient when
adjudicating discrimination against a large group. Assuming this
holding, courts could iron out the remaining doctrinal wrinkles in
two ways, but both are unsatisfactory. They could “level down” by
removing the special powers that pattern-or-practice confers on
classes, but this would conflict with the goals and principles of
Title VII. Or they could “level up,” giving individual plaintiffs the
same litigating power as groups. But this would create the problems with remedial scope, standing, and issue preclusion that justify class treatment in the first place.
1. Leveling down: group harms and remedies in Title VII.
Title VII’s goals and underlying principles require that
groups be allowed to contest discriminatory workplace practices.
Nixing pattern-or-practice powers for classes would frustrate this
goal. With its analytic focus on discriminatory practices—which
requires groupwide harm and corresponding groupwide relief—
the pattern-or-practice mechanism is a different animal than individual discrimination. Justifying the class limitation, the Tenth
Circuit explained that “[p]attern-or-practice claims, ‘by their very
nature, involve claims of classwide discrimination.’” 164 The Fourth
Circuit explained the difference between the “nature of [the]
164F

164 Daniels v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 701 F.3d 620, 633 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co. & Retail Meatcutters Union, Local 320, 773 F.2d 857, 866 n.6
(7th Cir. 1985)).
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remedies” available to classes and individuals: because pattern-orpractice suits “seek to redress widespread discrimination and the
harm suffered by the group of individuals subjected to that discrimination,” courts grant injunctive relief, like “affirmative action plans and the altering of a seniority system,” as opposed to
the individual remedies, like “reinstatement, hiring, back-pay,
[and] damages,” available in an individual case. 165
Congress intended for Title VII plaintiffs to get groupwide relief in addition to individual relief. The Senate Report on the 1972
amendments to Title VII stated that “[t]he committee agrees with
the courts that [T]itle VII actions are by their very nature class
complains [sic], and that any restriction on such actions would
greatly undermine the effectiveness of [T]itle VII.” 166 The Report
cited with approval cases where the EEOC vindicated a group interest, class actions, and representative suits where unions sued
to vindicate members’ antidiscrimination interests. 167 By holding
in Parisi that a plaintiff subject to an arbitration agreement cannot bring a pattern-or-practice suit in court, the Second Circuit
cut against Congress’s approach. The court explained that an entitlement to group claims would violate the Rules Enabling Act,
as Rule 23 cannot modify substantive rights. 168 But the Report
shows that a group right exists irrespective of the procedural
mechanism used to enforce it.
Theoretical lenses on equality borrowed from constitutional
law distinguish the Parisi court’s and the 1972 Senate’s approaches to Title VII. In the constitutional law context, equalprotection scholars distinguish between anticlassification and
antisubordination equality norms. 169 On the anticlassification
view, it is impermissible for the state (or, under Title VII, employers) to assign benefits or burdens on the basis of a disallowed classification like race. In contrast, antisubordination focuses on
eliminating or preventing the formation of a stratified society
165F

16F

167F

168F

169F

165 Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 158 F.3d 742, 761 (4th Cir. 1998), vacated on
other grounds, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999).
166 S. Rep. No. 92-415, at 27 (1971), reprinted in COMM. ON LABOR AND PUB. WELFARE,
92D CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972,
at 410, 436 (1972); see also Robert H. Rotstein, Comment, Federal Employment Discrimination: Scope of Inquiry and the Class Action Under Title VII, 22 UCLA L. REV. 1288, 1293
n.38 (1975).
167 See S. Rep. No. 92-415, at 27 n.16.
168 Parisi, 710 F.3d at 488.
169 See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification
Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472–73 (2004).
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with fixed barriers between groups. 170 Affirmative action, for example, conflicts with the anticlassification norm but could further
antisubordination ends. Professor Aziz Huq recently offered a
variation on this dichotomy. 171 He argues that in Bostock v. Clayton
County 172 (which extended Title VII’s antidiscrimination protections to sexual orientation and gender identity) the Court embraced transactional equality, which “looks to the granular motives of particular individuals.” 173 In contrast, the Black Lives
Matter movement “challenges institutional and social arrangements beyond the immediate interactions of individuals,” in the
infrastructural vein. 174
Discrimination under Title VII encompasses something
broader than classification. The statute separately makes it illegal
to “discriminate” due to a protected category and to “classify”
based on a protected category. 175 Disparate impact is a method of
“proof” of unlawful discrimination. 176 Professor Bradley Areheart
argues that Title VII cannot be understood without antisubordination principles in the background. The statute’s disparateimpact and reasonable-accommodation provisions sometimes require classification in order to remove barriers from particular
groups. 177 Courts interpreted Title VII to allow voluntary affirmative action because Congress intended “to abolish traditional
patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy.” 178 The threat posed
by Title VII—to eliminate status quo arrangements that have entrenched a racially stratified social structure—is also consistent
with Huq’s notion of infrastructural equality.
Despite Title VII’s antisubordinating principles, recent jurisprudence has taken an anticlassification approach to the law. The
Supreme Court has cast doubt on whether it is legal to use racial
170F

17F

172F

173F

174F

175F

176F

17F

178F

170 Id. (explaining that, on an antisubordination view, “practices that enforce the inferior social status of historically oppressed groups” are prohibited).
171 Aziz Z. Huq, Bostock v. BLM, BOS. REV. (July 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/LUF7-JZLT.
172 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
173 Huq, supra note 171.
174 Id.; see also Amna A. Akbar, Our Reckoning with Race, N.Y. REV. (Oct. 31, 2020),
https://perma.cc/DT9L-53DN (explaining how contemporary movements for racial justice
“focus not on individual bias but instead on infrastructure”).
175 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2).
176 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).
177 Bradley A. Areheart, The Anticlassification Turn in Employment Discrimination
Law, 63 ALA. L. REV. 955, 970–72 (2012). Under Title VII’s reasonable-accommodation
provision, employers must make accommodations for an employee’s religious practice as
long as it does not cause “undue hardship” to the business. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); see also,
e.g., Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382, 1383–84 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
178 Areheart, supra note 177, at 971.
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classifications to prevent the perpetuation of racial hierarchy. 179
In Ricci v. DeStefano, 180 the Court ruled that when an employer
discarded test results because white candidates performed systematically better than minority candidates, the employer discriminated against white candidates because it relied on racial
classifications to make the decision. 181 An implication of the holding is that the Supreme Court sees a discriminatory harm under
Title VII when an employer makes any racial classifications at
all, even if the employer’s intent is to further equality among
groups. This is certainly consistent with anticlassification, but
gives short shrift to the antisubordination value. Thus, the Parisi
court tracked the sweep of the Supreme Court’s Title VII jurisprudence. The possibility of an independent group claim—which
it rejected—is grounded in antisubordination. It requires finding
legal significance in a group’s ability to collectively contest its subordinated position. The Congress that passed Title VII evinced
that view of equality, in contrast to Parisi. 182 And unlike Ricci,
with its strengthening of the anticlassification value, the Parisi
court did not demonstrate any positive vision of equality in its
interpretation of Title VII. Though the courts have drifted away
from antisubordination in Title VII jurisprudence, the Parisi
court traveled too far from Congress’s scheme for the law.
Individual Title VII claims do not substitute for group claims,
as those actions only address discrimination in particular instances.
To combat subordination, plaintiffs must be able to address institutional practices. Eliminating private pattern-or-practice suits would
hinder the antisubordination goals of Title VII. If the statute was
passed to confer power on subordinate groups, their contestation
of their treatment as a collective via pattern-or-practice litigation
fits the statutory principles.
179F

180F

18F

182F

2. Leveling up: class treatment and pattern-or-practice
suits.
Leveling down would conflict with Title VII’s goals. So courts
might level up, by allowing individuals to bring pattern-or-practice
suits as well. But justifications for the class limitation align with
179

See id. at 993–95.
557 U.S. 557 (2009).
181 Id. at 579; see also Areheart, supra note 177, at 993 (explaining that, prior to Ricci,
“considering a practice’s racially disparate impact for antisubordination purposes was not
the sort of attention to race that threatens equality”).
182 See supra text accompanying notes 166–68 & 175–78.
180
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general principles that courts have articulated about the limits of
individual adjudication. 183 Individual pattern-or-practice suits
would implicate the remedial, standing, and issue-preclusion difficulties that justify class treatment in the first place.
Solo litigants generally cannot achieve the scope of relief envisioned by the pattern-or-practice structure. An equitable principle holds that “injunctive relief should be no more burdensome
to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the
plaintiffs.” 184 The Tenth and Fourth Circuits raised justifications
for the class limitation consistent with the principle. The courts
explained that the proper focus of an individual Title VII case is
an individual harm, not a groupwide pattern or policy, and the
scope of relief should match the harm. 185 A job applicant who was
not hired due to discrimination might obtain a court-ordered position at a company, but not a change to the company’s hiring
practices.
Remedial limits shade into standing doctrine. Solo litigants
only have standing to remedy harm to themselves, not to third
parties, 186 suggesting a constitutional dimension to the Tenth and
Fourth Circuits’ equitable concerns. The Eleventh Circuit explicitly noted that individual plaintiffs may lack standing to obtain
183F

184F

185F

186F

183 For a contrary view, see Tsang, supra note 28, at 330–33 (arguing that courts
should allow individual plaintiffs to bring pattern-or-practice claims). The doctrines that
justify the class limitation can certainly be criticized on their own terms, but their application in Title VII cases is consistent with that in other areas of the law. See, e.g., John C.
Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural Reform Revisited, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1387,
1418 (2007) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s limits on injunctive relief that “preclude the
use of systemic remedies for . . . institutional and systemic problems” in suits against police departments for constitutional violations).
184 Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994) (quoting Califano
v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979)). For a discussion of conflicting principles regarding
the scope of relief for injunctions in individual cases, see Carroll, supra note 28, at 2030–
34. Indeed, the narrowing principles that justify limiting the pattern-or-practice method
conflict with the principles the Supreme Court articulated in extending the doctrine. See
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763–66 (1976) (explaining that courts have
“broad equitable discretion” to fashion groupwide relief in Title VII cases). Yet Franks was
a class action.
185 See Daniels, 701 F.3d at 633 (“Proving an employer had [ ] a [discriminatory] policy
does not prove individual employment decisions were discriminatory, although such evidence might be relevant to individual claims.”); Lowery, 158 F.3d at 761 (explaining that
an individual employment-discrimination plaintiff litigates “the discrete question of
whether the employer discriminated against the plaintiff in a specific instance,” rather
than “common questions of fact,” and can win individual relief like reinstatement or hiring, rather than groupwide prospective relief like “affirmative action plans [or] the altering of a seniority system”).
186 See McKenzie v. City of Chicago, 118 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[P]laintiffs
lack standing to seek . . . relief that benefits third parties.”).
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prospective relief. 187 Once a plaintiff is no longer being harmed by
a particular policy, they have standing to challenge the policy only
if there is a high likelihood of future harm. 188 For example, an
employee who is fired then reinstated by a judicial order is probably unlikely to be fired again for the same reason.
In addition to standing, the Eleventh Circuit highlighted a
concern with issue preclusion. Individual pattern-or-practice
claims would lead to unfair results for defendants. 189 Say an individual plaintiff won a pattern-or-practice claim against an employer. With the employer barred by issue preclusion from directly contesting the declaratory judgment that it had a pattern
of discrimination, coworkers in subsequent individual cases
would benefit from a tilted playing field. The defendant would
need to argue that each individual was not affected by the judicially recognized pattern. But if an individual lost her pattern-orpractice claim, future plaintiffs would not be precluded from
prosecuting new claims. Eventually, the employer will lose a case
and potentially be liable for expensive injunctive relief. 190 The procedural safeguards of the class action justify the structure and
stakes of a pattern-or-practice claim.
Unlike the other concerns, the Second Circuit’s justification
for the class limitation relied on a misunderstanding of patternor-practice. The Second Circuit explained that it would be inappropriate to give individuals access to pattern-or-practice burdenshifting because “[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of
fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the
plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” 191 But the patternor-practice mechanism does not change the ultimate burden. In
the damages phase, the burden of proof is the same as in an
187F

18F

189F

190F

19F

187 Davis, 516 F.3d at 968 (explaining that, without formal class certification, “named
plaintiffs lack standing to pursue such [prospective] relief for themselves, because the
complaint did not allege a likelihood that they will be denied a supervisory position in the
future”).
188 See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983); see also Carroll, supra
note 28, at 2036.
189 Davis, 516 F.3d at 968–69. The court noted both res judicata (claim preclusion)
and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) problems. While there are issue-preclusion problems, Davis does not seem to demonstrate claim preclusion, that is, serial litigation of
claims between the same parties. The reference to res judicata may reflect courts’ inconsistency with this lexicon. See 18 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 131.10[1] (3d ed. 2020).
190 See Carroll, supra note 28, at 2052–55.
191 Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 685 F.3d 135, 149 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Tex.
Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (alteration in original)).
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individual case: an employee must establish an adverse employment action due to membership in a protected class. Because the
liability ruling established that there was a pattern of discrimination, the defendant must introduce individualized contrary evidence to overcome the natural presumption that the individual
was affected by that pattern. Yet aside from misunderstanding the
phased litigation structure, the Second Circuit just restates the
problem. Why allow burden shifting for classes but not individuals?
B.

The Right Result: Some Group Claims Are Concerted
Activities

As we have seen, courts might disavow the private patternor-practice claim entirely. Depending on what courts do next, this
would either conflict with Title VII’s goals or cause procedural
problems in individual cases. Instead, perhaps not all class
claims can be barred by arbitration agreements. However, the
Epic Systems Court was skeptical that group litigation, at least
under the FLSA, was protected by the NLRA. If there is a door
open to argue that some Title VII pattern-or-practice class litigation is protected, the gap is narrow.
This Comment argues that some pattern-or-practice litigation is protected by the NLRA. When group plaintiffs seek prospective relief to change workplace practices via a class action, their
activity likely falls within § 7. Yet one more piece is necessary. The
Supreme Court indicated that courtroom activity is not something that “employees ‘just do’ for themselves.” 192 But why not, if
lawyer-mediated collective bargaining is protected? By eschewing
the formal collectivity of an FLSA group and focusing attention
instead on what employees “just do,” the majority suggests a functional inquiry into the nature of a group’s litigative practices to
determine if its litigation is concerted.
This Section proposes a new test to guide such an inquiry. In
the liability phase of a pattern-or-practice suit, courts should
treat group litigation as a concerted activity if the existence of a
plaintiff group participating in the lawsuit predates the lawsuit.
This test operationalizes the idea that, to be protected, an activity
must be related to “self-organization,” the first item in the
NLRA’s list of protected activities. 193
192F

193F

192 Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1625 (quoting NLRB v. Alt. Ent., Inc., 858 F.3d 393, 415
(6th Cir. 2017) (Sutton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis omitted)).
193 29 U.S.C. § 157.
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The test comes from securities litigation. When determining
whether a group of investors can serve as lead plaintiff under the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 194 (PSLRA),
courts look to “the existence of a pre-litigation relationship between
group members.” 195 Securities litigation is quite different from employment discrimination, but, as in this problem, PSLRA courts attempt to distinguish actual from fictitious group cohesion. 196
In the remainder of this Section, I explain and defend the
proposed test. First, I distinguish pattern-or-practice class litigation from FLSA litigation under Epic Systems. Then, I show how
PSLRA courts distinguish lawyer-driven litigation from groupdriven litigation. Courts can determine if group litigation is protected by § 7 of the NLRA in the same way. Next, I apply the test
to a few cases. Finally, I evaluate potential problems and consider
variations on the test.
194F

195F

196F

1. Distinguishing Title VII from the FLSA under Epic
Systems.
In Part I.C, I justified a narrow reading of Epic Systems due
to the FLSA’s limitations on prospective injunctive relief and
class actions. In contrast, class plaintiffs in Title VII pattern-orpractice cases can achieve broad, prospective, and groupwide relief, allowing plaintiffs to address the infrastructural nature of
discriminatory practices. 197 If employees band together to change
employer practices—which they can do under Title VII but not
the FLSA—their concerted litigation activity falls squarely under NLRA § 7, which insulates what they do for “mutual aid or
protection.” 198
Indeed, pattern-or-practice litigation often substitutes for
protected concerted activity. A group that engages in litigation
selects it from a suite of possible activities that it can use to achieve
its goals. In Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Service Co., 199
litigation grew out of direct action. Black workers first challenged
Jeffboat’s discriminatory promotion practices via mass protest.
197F

198F

19F

194 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
195 Varghese v. China Shenghuo Pharm. Holdings, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d 388, 392
(S.D.N.Y. 2008); see also Burch, supra note 150, at 110 n.94 (collecting cases).
196 Burch, supra note 150, at 110–11.
197 See supra Part II.A.1.
198 29 U.S.C. § 157.
199 940 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1991), aff’d and reh’g denied, 963 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1992).
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Demonstrations in August 1975, “known as the ‘Black Days’ protests, involved speeches, petition signing and a call for negotiations between the Black Workers’ Coalition and Jeffboat’s administration.” 200 When the demonstrations failed and participants
were disciplined, group members filed a pattern-or-practice lawsuit under Title VII. 201 The initial actions the group took to challenge Jeffboat’s employment practices—forming the Black Workers’ Coalition, demonstrating in the Black Days, and signing
petitions—are protected under the NLRA. 202 Filing class litigation
to obtain injunctive relief is another means by which the group
pursued the end of changing Jeffboat’s business practices.
Pattern-or-practice litigation can also complement collective
bargaining. In Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Board of
Education, 203 the Chicago Teachers Union (CTU) and a class of
Black school staff challenged a school-board policy intended to reform underperforming schools. 204 The Board chose only schools on
the south and west sides of Chicago for “turnarounds”—wholesale
replacement of staff—leading to disproportionate layoffs of Black
employees. 205 The CTU sought “prospective injunctive relief including a moratorium on turnarounds and the appointment of a
monitor to evaluate and oversee any new turnaround process.” 206
The Seventh Circuit approved class certification for the purposes
of injunctive relief, because such relief would apply classwide. 207
Plaintiffs in a similar position to the Chicago teachers can bargain over such policies and be protected by the NLRA. 208 These
plaintiffs sought the same outcome via group litigation.
A group that exists prior to litigation, like the Black Workers’
Coalition at Jeffboat or the CTU, chooses to sue when it determines that litigation will serve its purposes more effectively than
20F

201F

20F

203F

204F

205F

206F

207F

208F

200

Id. at 1040.
Id. at 1039–40.
202 See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (“Employees shall have the right to self-organization.”); Epic
Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1625 (discussing picketing within the NLRA’s regulatory scheme);
Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 866 F.3d 885, 889 (8th Cir. 2017) (explaining that “a
firing for picket-line misconduct is an unfair labor practice” except under certain conditions).
203 797 F.3d 426 (7th Cir. 2015).
204 Id. at 441.
205 Id. at 431–32.
206 Id. at 441.
207 Id. at 442.
208 See 29 U.S.C. § 157. The Chicago teachers themselves are not subject to the NLRA,
as public employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2). Rather, they are covered by an Illinois-specific
labor regime and were barred from bargaining over layoff policies until recently. See
Heather Cherone, Pritzker Signs Bill Restoring Bargaining Rights for Chicago Teachers,
WTTW NEWS (Apr. 2, 2021), https://perma.cc/A7TW-2MDM.
201
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other activities. Addressing inequality in the workplace, as Title VII
litigation does, is within the scope of the purposes protected by
§ 7. Litigation must be “[an]other concerted activit[y],” 209 as the
alternatives available to the group clearly are.
Arguments that Epic Systems applies to Title VII rely on an
unjustified assumption that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
§ 7 applies to all group litigation. 210 To counter Justice Ginsburg’s
suggestion that Epic Systems does not reach Title VII group actions, Carson Miller explained that Title VII evinces no intent to
override the FAA. 211 But the relevant question is not whether
Title VII overrides the FAA. Rather, courts must first determine
whether there is room left after Epic Systems for the NLRA to
protect some Title VII litigation. I argue that there is, as the
FLSA and Title VII are distinguishable. Second, courts must determine whether the NLRA overrides the FAA. I have argued that
it does. 212
209F

210F

21F

21F

2. Prelitigation groups and the PSLRA.
The structure and remedies of Title VII potentially allow
plaintiffs to pursue “mutual aid or protection” in a concerted manner via pattern-or-practice litigation. But class litigation might
not reflect that kind of activity. Federal judges often suspect that
class plaintiffs do not decide to litigate; lawyers do. As Judge
Richard Posner put it in one decision: “All [the class representative’s] moves in this suit were almost certainly the lawyer’s. Realistically, functionally, practically, she is the class representative, not [the plaintiff].” 213 The Epic Systems Court’s implication
that litigation is not something employees “‘just do’ for themselves” likely constitutes a similar judgment. 214 But not all class
213F

214F

209

29 U.S.C. § 157.
See Miller, supra note 29, at 1179; Williams v. Dearborn Motors 1, LLC (Dearborn II), No. 17-12724, 2018 WL 3870068, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 15, 2018) (explaining
that the Court “framed the issue broadly” and stressing Concepcion’s concern for individual adjudications).
211 Miller, supra note 29, at 1183–84.
212 See supra text accompanying notes 151–55.
213 Culver v. City of Milwaukee, 277 F.3d 908, 913 (7th Cir. 2002).
214 Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1625 (quoting Alt. Ent., 858 F.3d at 415 (Sutton, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis omitted)). Compare to that judgement
Judge Jeffrey Sutton’s opinion, in which he reached the same ultimate result as the Epic
Systems majority but found that litigation pursued by workers is a concerted activity:
“[T]heir legal action is protected if they are substantively cooperating in the litigation
campaign—say by pooling money, coordinating the timing of their claims, or sharing
210
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actions have this character. In fact, the PSLRA expressly created
procedures to ensure that plaintiffs, not lawyers, manage litigation. 215 Courts can borrow tests from the PSLRA to determine if
pattern-or-practice litigation reflects concerted activity and is
thus protected by § 7 of the NLRA.
Congress passed the PSLRA in 1995 to curb frivolous securities lawsuits. 216 Congress kept the tail from wagging the dog, ensuring that plaintiffs control their counsel rather than vice versa.
To ensure plaintiff control, the law included special certification
procedures for named plaintiffs and required courts to pick the
most “adequate” plaintiff to oversee the litigation, presumably the
plaintiff with the most at stake. 217
Securities law is far afield from employment law, but a relationship between the PSLRA and worker protection may not be
as surprising as it first seems. Professor David Webber argues
that the PSLRA enhances worker voice. The statutory requirements lead courts to regularly select pension funds and labor union
funds as lead plaintiffs, allowing “labor’s capital” to enforce good
corporate governance. 218
Lower courts have differed on how to interpret a provision of
the PSLRA that permits a “group of persons” to be appointed lead
plaintiff. 219 Some courts simply allow any group. 220 To others, that
literal reading would frustrate congressional intent, allowing
plaintiffs’ counsel to evade effective supervision by assembling
215F

216F

217F

218F

219F

20F

attorneys and legal strategy.” Alt. Ent., 858 F.3d at 414 (Sutton, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), overruled by Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. 1612. On Judge Sutton’s view,
cooperation in a litigation campaign (in court or arbitration) is protected, but a particular
procedural mechanism like a class action is not.
215 Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions, and Other Developments in the Selection of
Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 60 (2001) (describing the
PSLRA as “an effort to reform class action procedures to secure more effective client control”).
216 Gilles, supra note 111, at 386 & n.84. For a critical evaluation of the PSLRA’s
passage and impact, see generally andré douglas pond cummings, “Ain’t No Glory in Pain”:
How the 1994 Republican Revolution and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Contributed to the Collapse of the United States Capital Markets, 83 NEB. L. REV. 979 (2005).
217 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)–(3).
218 David Webber, Reforming Pensions While Retaining Shareholder Voice, 99 B.U. L.
REV. 1001, 1012–13 (2019). In fact, MissPERS, a Mississippi public pension fund, was lead
plaintiff in a PSLRA case investors filed against a jewelry chain due to negative publicity
from a Title VII case. In re Signet Jewelers Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 16-cv-06728, 2020 WL
4196468, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2020). The securities-fraud claims settled for $240 million, id.; the discrimination case is ongoing. See infra text accompanying notes 267–72.
219 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I).
220 See, e.g., D’Hondt v. Digi Int’l, Inc., No. 97-5, 1997 WL 405668, at *3 (D. Minn.
Apr. 3, 1997).
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diffuse groups of unrelated investors. 221 These courts allow only
“close-knit” groups that have “a meaningful relationship preceding the litigation” and share more than ownership of “the same
securities.” 222 Taking a middle path, a third set of courts takes a
multifactor approach. 223 Along with factors that purport to evaluate the group’s capacity to supervise the case, these courts consider “the existence of a pre-litigation relationship between group
members.” 224 The Third Circuit endorsed this “rule of reason” approach: unrelated investors can constitute a lead-plaintiff group,
unless a group is too large to supervise litigation or was created
by the machinations of counsel. 225
In determining whether Title VII pattern-or-practice litigation constitutes a concerted activity, courts should borrow the
most restrictive test from the PSLRA: whether plaintiffs have a
relationship that predates the lawsuit. Without having a prelitigation relationship, plaintiffs, as a group, could not have affirmatively selected litigation to achieve “mutual aid or protection.”
This rule avoids the uncertainty and judicial discretion that
would be created by importing the flexible standards of the ruleof-reason approach to the PSLRA. It is also consistent with district courts’ exceptions to the class limitation—plaintiff associations that exist outside of litigation. 226
The proposed test avoids the Supreme Court’s unease with
using the NLRA to protect procedural innovations that postdate
its enactment. 227 The 1966 revisions to the Federal Rules that created the modern Rule 23 were driven by the desire to facilitate
redress for unorganized groups—in particular, Black Americans
facing entrenched discrimination and diffuse consumers who
faced harm from mass manufacturers and polluters. 228 They created a novel “interest class” justification for collective treatment.
Those who share an interest in the result of litigation can be
bound together, despite lacking a relationship outside
21F
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23F

24F

25F

26F

27F

28F

221

Aronson v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
Id. at 1153–54.
223 Varghese, 589 F. Supp. 2d at 392.
224 Id. at 392.
225 In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 266–67 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Chill v.
Green Tree Fin. Corp., 181 F.R.D. 398, 409 (D. Minn. 1998)).
226 See supra text accompanying notes 75–77.
227 See Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1624 (“The notion that Section 7 confers a right to
class or collective actions seems pretty unlikely when you recall that procedures like that
were hardly known when the NLRA was adopted in 1935.”).
228 STEVEN YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS
ACTION 240–45 (1987).
222
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litigation. 229 Rule 23’s antecedents, however, usually did require
prelitigation groups. 230 The PSLRA test would allow courts to determine when a “courtroom-bound ‘activit[y]’” is also something
employees “just do,” 231 and it yields results that are consistent
with the history of group litigation.
29F

230F

231F

3. Architecture of arbitration and pattern-or-practice suits.
This Section examines how the proposed rule would work in
actual pattern-or-practice cases. The cases discussed above (under the additional hypothetical assumption that parties had
agreed to arbitration) furnish productive examples to consider
whether the proposed rule would preclude arbitration in the liability phase. Regardless, arbitration would still be used in the
damages phase of a pattern-or-practice case. Individual proceedings in the damages phase do not constitute concerted activity.
Courts can look for signs of prelitigation relatedness among
a group pursuing a Title VII pattern-or-practice case. The relationship must be geared toward addressing workplace conditions;
otherwise, all potential plaintiffs who know each other as coworkers would automatically satisfy the test. At an extreme, workers
may have explicitly created an association to combat workplace
discrimination or have joined a union to pursue concerted activity. For less organized workplaces, evidence like petitions or
meetings regarding how to address discrimination, or evidence
that class members approached the lawyers as a group and not
vice versa, could suffice. In Mozee, the organizing activity of Black
employees via the Black Workers’ Coalition would have justified
a class action for a pattern-or-practice suit even if they had signed
individual arbitration agreements. Even without the coalition,
the workers engaged in protests to change workplace conditions,
which shows a prelitigation relationship.
The class plaintiffs in CTU alleged that the Board of Education’s school-closing policies were discriminatory. 232 If they had
signed arbitration agreements (and were private employees
23F

229

Id. at 248.
Id. at 221–22 (explaining that Rule 48 of the Federal Equity Rules of 1843 provided for group litigation, but courts typically would apply the Rule only if absent parties
chose to join litigating organizations).
231 Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1625 (quoting Alt. Ent., 858 F.3d at 415 (Sutton, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis omitted)).
232 See supra text accompanying notes 203–04.
230
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subject to the NLRA), 233 then they would be able to litigate because of the organizing activity embodied by the union. It is no
surprise that a union’s activity is protected by § 7. The list of concerted activities expressly includes “form[ing] . . . labor organizations,” as well as unions’ representative action in collective bargaining. 234 That said, a collective bargaining agreement that
assigned Title VII pattern-or-practice claims to arbitration would
still be enforced, 235 as the choice is made on a groupwide basis.
The union would be expressly allocating a future group claim to
arbitration, on behalf of the group.
In Parisi, plaintiffs’ actual arbitration agreements were before the court, and the Second Circuit held that those agreements
were enforceable. 236 The Second Circuit’s ruling was consistent
with the proposed rule. The putative class showed no evidence of
prelitigation organization. The plaintiff sought to certify a class
of female managing directors, vice presidents, and associates at
Goldman Sachs, 237 with no indication that potential class members even knew about the lawsuit. Likely, Parisi’s lawyer added
the class claim to make the case make financial sense. So the
Second Circuit’s rejection of class certification is consistent with
the proposed test.
Akin to Parisi, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 238 plaintiffs
alleged that Wal-Mart’s sexist practices affected 1.5 million
women at worksites around the country. 239 The Supreme Court
found that the proposed class lacked commonality. 240 Had the
plaintiffs been facing mandatory arbitration rather than class
certification, they would fail the proposed test. There was no prelitigation connection alleged among them.
These examples are on the extreme ends. A closer case is
Williams v. Dearborn Motors 1 (Dearborn III). 241 Brian P. Williams
and Jay Howard brought a class action against a car dealership
where they worked, alleging a racial pay disparity. They
23F
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236F

237F

238F

239F

240F

241F
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See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2).
29 U.S.C. § 157.
235 See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 251 (2009) (holding that union
members’ individual statutory age-discrimination claims must be arbitrated when arbitration is agreed to in their collective bargaining agreement).
236 Parisi, 710 F.3d at 488.
237 Id. at 485.
238 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
239 Id. at 343.
240 Id. at 356.
241 No. 17-12714, 2020 WL 1242821 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 16, 2020).
234
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proceeded in the same litigation but had filed individual claims
with the EEOC. 242 If they approached the lawyer that they retained together or on behalf of a larger group, that might constitute a prelitigation relationship. 243 But it would not satisfy the
test if the lawyer had assembled the group claim on his own initiative. Courts could also look at the character of the plaintiffs’
opposition to the policies at the worksite itself. The complaint
stated that a plaintiff, Howard, complained to the dealership
about “race-based compensation disparities.” 244 How did Howard
complain? If Howard had approached his employer as part of a
group—for example, with likeminded coworkers or armed with a
petition—that might tend toward finding a relationship among
the class. But if he were just advocating for himself, that would
not be enough.
In reality, the court hearing the Dearborn Motors litigation
dismissed the class, extending Epic Systems to Title VII. 245 Yet
the employer’s contractual offer of arbitration proved illusory, as
Dearborn Motors could not afford to arbitrate Howard’s claim. 246
Though Howard’s individual claim resumed in court, Williams
could not get relief because his only claim was embedded in the
groupwide pay disparity claim that was dismissed with the
class. 247 If the court had used the proposed test, perhaps Williams
would not have been shut out of court. 248
Having examined the test more closely, we turn to its operation in a pattern-or-practice class action. An employer would not
be able to compel arbitration to stymie class certification in a
pattern-or-practice case if the group’s organization predates the
24F

243F

24F

245F

246F

247F

248F

242

Id. at *1.
In its published guidance to employees, the NLRB states that a concerted activity is
when “two or more employees take action for their mutual aid or protection regarding terms
and conditions of employment.” NLRB, EMPLOYEE RIGHTS, https://perma.cc/7WU8-HESU;
cf. Melissa K. Stull, Annotation, Spontaneous or Informal Activities of Employees as “Concerted Activities,” Within Meaning of § 7 of National Labor Relations Act (29 USCS § 157),
107 A.L.R. Fed. 244, 251 (1992) (noting that “the most obvious type of concerted activity
occurs where two or more employees are working together,” but “a single employee” can
also engage in a concerted activity, in particular if she represents others). That guidance
might be persuasive regarding the scope of the proposed test. If so, Williams and Howard’s
joint activity alone would be enough to constitute a prelitigation relationship.
244 Williams v. Dearborn Motors 1, LLC (Dearborn I), No. 17-12724, 2018 WL
3092790, at *2 (E.D. Mich. May 24, 2018).
245 Dearborn II, 2018 WL 3870068, at *2.
246 Dearborn III, 2020 WL 1242821, at *2.
247 Id. at *4.
248 Williams likely would not have collected damages anyway. A business that cannot
pay for arbitration probably cannot pay a judgment either.
243
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lawsuit, because that would be an unfair labor practice under the
NLRA. The group could obtain injunctive and declaratory relief,
but arbitration would be required in the damages phase.
Arbitration in the damages phase is consistent with the
pattern-or-practice litigation scheme. The liability and damages
phases of a pattern-or-practice case are procedurally distinct.
Nonclass associations can only participate in the liability
phase. 249 Likewise, Rule 23(b)(2) classes can only pursue injunctive and declaratory relief, not individualized damages. 250 Postliability, the damages phase involves individual “additional proceedings.” 251 There might be a proceeding for each class member. 252 These proceedings could easily be arbitrations. The arbitrator would have a presumption that the employer engaged in
an unlawful discriminatory policy. 253
In extending Epic Systems to Title VII pattern-or-practice
cases, the Dearborn Motors court stressed that the plaintiffs’ attack on “the individualized nature of the arbitration proceedings”
was precluded by Concepcion. 254 As discussed, the NLRA might
suspend the FAA for litigation that falls into § 7. 255 But in addition,
requiring arbitrations in the damages phase preserves contractedfor individual adjudications where individualized proof and relief
are at issue. The pattern-or-practice structure allows plaintiffs’
groups to pursue liability rulings without destroying contractual
expectations with respect to individual adjudication.
249F

250F

251F

25F

253F

254F

25F

4. Limitations of the PSLRA test.
The test proposed above—whether a litigating group predates a lawsuit—is one way courts can determine whether a
group is acting in a concerted manner when it litigates. In this
249 Emps. Committed for Just. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 407 F. Supp. 2d 423, 433
(W.D.N.Y. 2005).
250 Dukes, 564 U.S. at 360, 366–67.
251 Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 361.
252 McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 491 (7th
Cir. 2012) (explaining that, in a disparate-impact case with the same structure, “hundreds
of separate trials may be necessary” in the damages phase “to determine which class members were actually adversely affected” and “what loss each [ ] sustained”).
253 This structure is very similar to the “hybrid” litigation-arbitration model proposed
by Professors Myriam Gilles and Anthony Sebok, in which attorneys could seek an “enforceable judicial judgment” of liability, followed by “subsequent serial arbitrations,” using
the judicial ruling for its preclusive or persuasive effect. Gilles & Sebok, supra note 42, at
468–70.
254 Dearborn Motors 1, 2018 WL 3870068, at *2.
255 See supra text accompanying notes 151–55.
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Section, I consider alternatives to and limitations of the test.
First, courts could use standards adopted from the PSLRA ruleof-reason approach—rather than a bright-line rule—but a rule
has advantages for litigation expectations. Second, plaintiffs or
attorneys may try to game the rule by organizing in advance of
litigation or creating paper organizations. I argue that this risk is
limited. Third, some litigating groups are left out by the proposed
rule. This is a severe limitation of the rule. They are no less deserving of protection from discrimination at work.
The proposed test is intended to be a simple bright-line rule
to cabin judicial discretion in determining if group litigation is
protected. 256 As such, it likely does not perfectly capture all or exclusively the conduct that it is intended to. 257 For example, perhaps an organized group exists, but its activities are unrelated to
the problems that led to litigation, and group members do not
plan to oversee the lawyers. Such a group would pass the prelitigation test, but in reality, the litigation would not reflect concerted activity. Courts could instead analyze concertedness with
a standard. For the courts that take the rule-of-reason approach
to the PSLRA, “the extent of the prior relationships” among group
members is only one, nondispositive factor that is considered. 258
Most importantly, groups must show “an ability (and a desire) to
work collectively to manage the litigation.” 259 To show independence from counsel and capacity for collective organization, those
courts look to factors like members’ “involvement . . . in litigation
thus far,” “plans for cooperation,” “sophistication,” and “whether
the members chose outside counsel, and not vice versa.” 260 For example, one court found that, because investors had “held joint
conference calls” to form a litigating strategy “separately and
apart from their lawyers,” they could constitute a lead-plaintiff
group. 261 A dissent that presaged Epic Systems explained that a
litigation campaign is concerted if workers “substantively
256F

257F

258F

259F

260F

261F

256 See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI L. REV. 1175,
1179–80 (1989).
257 See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 990–91 (1995).
258 Cendant, 264 F.3d at 266–67.
259 Reimer v. Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 08-411, 2008 WL 2073931, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
May 9, 2008).
260 Varghese, 589 F. Supp. 2d at 392.
261 Reimer, 2008 WL 2073931, at *3.
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cooperat[e],” for example, “by pooling money, coordinating the
timing of their claims, or sharing attorneys and legal strategy.” 262
But in the Title VII arbitration context, a rule is preferable
to a multifactor standard. Litigants should be able to predict ex
ante whether they will end up in court. Extended proceedings in
federal court ought to be avoided if possible, as that is exactly
what parties who agree to arbitrate do not want. A bright-line
rule that does not give a sympathetic factfinder leeway to invalidate arbitration agreements left and right better addresses the
Supreme Court’s unease with legal strategies that attempt endruns around arbitration.
At the same time, one might wonder whether a hard-edged
proposed rule could be gamed by clever plaintiffs—or their attorneys. 263 Such gaming could work in two ways. First, anticipating
the application of the rule, plaintiffs could engage in group activity to contest employer practices outside of and prior to litigation,
perhaps on the advice of counsel. This kind of strategic behavior
would be good: if workers succeed, they would conserve judicial
resources. It is also in line with the regulatory regime established
by the NLRA, which envisions a limited state role in labor and
management’s joint governance of the workplace. 264
Second, plaintiff-side attorneys could fake it. Like corporate
lawyers creating shell companies, plaintiffs’ lawyers could create
associations that exist only on paper. But to the extent that the
existence of a cohesive plaintiff group turns on a contested question of fact, the NLRA and the FAA both include procedures to
resolve such disputes. When the NLRB conducts a hearing on an
unfair labor practice, it uses the Federal Rules of Evidence. 265 In
a motion to compel arbitration under the FAA, the court must
“proceed summarily to [a] trial” if there is a factual question regarding the formation or performance of an arbitration
26F

263F

264F

265F

262 Alt. Ent., 858 F.3d at 414 (Sutton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part),
overruled by Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. 1612.
263 See Sunstein, supra note 257, at 995 (“Because rules have clear edges, they allow
people to ‘evade’ them by engaging in conduct that is technically exempted but that [is
substantively] the same.”).
264 Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90
YALE L.J. 1509, 1545 (1981) (elucidating and critiquing the “industrial pluralist” ideology
of the NLRA and its judicial interpretations, whereby the workplace is a miniature democracy in which “labor and management jointly determine workplace conditions” with “limited” government intervention).
265 29 U.S.C. § 160(b).
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agreement. 266 Factual disputes created by attorneys trying to game
the rules are no different than any other dispute in litigation.
The biggest problem with the proposed rule is that it excludes
deserving classes. Sterling Jewelers, owner of Kay and Jared, has
been in a class arbitration with women employees over discriminatory pay and promotions for over a decade. 267 Sterling’s mandatory arbitration agreements were silent on whether they allowed
class proceedings, and the arbitrator permitted a class for declaratory and injunctive relief of the disparate-impact claims. 268
Though the class was only certified for pay-and-promotions
claims, a culture of sexual harassment pervaded the company.
The annual managers’ retreat typically included “Bacchian” levels of drinking and sex, combined with explicit coercion or promises of advancement for women who consented to sex. 269 After they
were contacted by employees at one store, lawyers discovered that
the company’s practices spanned its operations across regions and
business lines, emanating from a “good old boys’ club” at the
top. 270 The chief executive, Mark Light, allegedly “conditioned
women’s success” on sex. 271 “The company culture oozed downward” to other executives and individual stores. 272
Because of Concepcion and Epic Systems, the Sterlings of today probably use class waivers. A pattern-or-practice claim on
Sterling’s facts arising from contemporary employment contracts
would be channeled into individual arbitrations. The group of employees fails the proposed test because it was created by lawyers
for the purpose of litigation. Without a company-wide adjudication,
many potential plaintiffs would fall through the cracks, either not
knowing their legal rights or unable to afford representation, 273
and the company’s practices might go unreformed.
This shows the limits of using the NLRA to combat arbitration agreements after Epic Systems. Even when employees are
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9 U.S.C. § 4.
Taffy Brodesser-Akner, The Company That Sells Love to America Had a Dark Secret, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 23, 2019), https://perma.cc/LN65-TTYX; Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 942 F.3d 617, 620–21 (2d Cir. 2019).
268 Jock, 942 F.3d at 620–21. Prior to Concepcion, fewer employers used class waivers,
as they could be found unconscionable in some jurisdictions. See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at
340; CARLTON FIELDS, supra note 32, at 40 (showing that the percentage of companies that
use class waivers more than doubled after 2012).
269 Brodesser-Akner, supra note 267.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 Id.
273 See Sternlight, supra note 12, at 1334–35.
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not acting in a concerted manner, they deserve access to patternor-practice relief. The root problem is Concepcion, which allows
companies to contract out of group proceedings. 274 Yet perhaps the
NLRA should have played a larger role in the Sterling case. Employees at Sterling were barred from sharing stories of harassment because they signed nondisclosure agreements. 275 Because
jewelry store workers who were harassed could not talk about it
with their coworkers, it was less likely that they would realize
harassment was a systemic problem and organize against it prior
to litigation. However, the confidentiality provisions that made
concerted action unlikely in the first place may have been illegal
under the NLRA. 276
As the Sterling case shows, using a PSLRA test to determine
whether litigation is a concerted activity would leave mandatory
arbitration in place for many potential pattern-or-practice plaintiffs. Title VII plaintiffs who are subject to mandatory arbitration
are currently shut out of court. If courts adopt the proposed test,
many plaintiffs would be able to get groupwide relief for discriminatory practices. Yet to achieve a systemic change to mandatory
arbitration in the workplace, Congress needs to step up.
274F
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CONCLUSION
Lower courts have read Epic Systems to reach all group litigation, not just litigation under the FLSA. But that is not a necessary implication of the decision. The Supreme Court focused attention on what plaintiffs do, rather than their formal status,
which might leave a window open for plaintiffs who act together
to change workplace practices, like Title VII pattern-or-practice
plaintiffs. The federal courts limit solo litigants’ ability to win prospective injunctive relief. So it makes sense to give group plaintiffs a greater ability to stick together. The alternative is to denude
statutory schemes of the remedial relief that Congress intended.
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See supra text accompanying notes 114–20.
Brodesser-Akner, supra note 267.
276 The NLRB recently ruled that confidentiality provisions in arbitration agreements
do not violate the NLRA if they apply only to the arbitration process itself but might if
they bar communication about the circumstances giving rise to the dispute. Cal. Com.
Club, 369 N.L.R.B. No. 106, at 1, 6 (June 19, 2020); cf. Samuel Estreicher & Lukasz
Swiderski, Issue Preclusion in Employment Arbitration After Epic Systems v. Lewis, 4 U.
PA. J.L. & PUB. AFFS. 15, 24–31 (2018) (suggesting that, outside the NLRA, arbitration
confidentiality provisions may be unconscionable notwithstanding Concepcion and proposing that arbitrators disclose prior opinions where relevant).
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To determine when litigation is something workers just do,
Title VII courts should borrow tests from the PSLRA. That statute requires courts to closely scrutinize litigating groups for independence and concertedness. When a group is acting together to
change discriminatory workplace practices, pattern-or-practice
class litigation is protected from employer interference, including motions to compel arbitration. This model is aligned with
Congress’s overall statutory scheme. Title VII confers greater
power on litigative groups pursuing pattern-or-practice claims,
due to Congress’s goal of directly changing workplace practices.
That purpose is consistent with the NLRA, which protects workers’ group activities to challenge their employers. And by allocating individual damages proceedings to arbitration, this scheme
lets arbitration do what it does best, 277 leaving the rest to federal
courts.
27F

277 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344, 347–48 (explaining that the individual nature of arbitration is “fundamental,” whereas groupwide proceedings are anathema to it).

